Negotiations?

I have a two part piece on Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations. The first half lays out the issues:

The most difficult issues involve the post-ceasefire political and military constraints on Ukraine. Any outcome that leaves Ukraine under the political control of dedicated anti-Russian leadership and allows Ukraine to fully rearm itself is a defeat for Moscow, no matter how much territory Russia is able to seize.

The political and military neutering of Ukraine is at the core of Russia’s war aims, and if those issues aren’t addressed, it’s not clear that Moscow will see a reason to end the conflict. 

Moscow and Washington both insist on Ukrainian elections in the near term, perhaps out of a hope that they can control those elections and create more flexibility in Kyiv. It’s probably in Zelensky’s best interests to go along with that plan and do as much as he can to shape a reasonably fair process.

Just as troubling is the long-term Russian demand that Ukraine accept significant limitations on its arms industry and its foreign-arms acquisition policy.

Russia treats this demand as core to its own security, while Ukraine sees it as an invitation for a third Russian invasion. This problem is tied closely to the question of security guarantees, as some have floated an “armed neutrality” strategy that would amount to transferring substantial military capabilities to Ukraine—a policy that is unlikely to satisfy Russia.

And the second digs into the dangers of trying to cut Ukraine and Europe out:

In theory, any diplomatic negotiation should involve all of the partners affected by a particular problem, whether that problem is war, climate change, or international trade. In practice, including additional voices always complicates the process of negotiation, especially when those voices hold fast to difficult or intractable demands. 

Let there be no mistake: The exclusion of Ukraine from a negotiation over its own fate is amoral and perverse. Any peace it leads to will likely amount to a temporary ceasefire, rather than a genuine and lasting accord. But it is what it is; the United States and Russia have determined to do this, and Europe and Ukraine have to wait and see the result.

Here’s an NYT explainer on the possible pacing and a review of the issues. Note that while Ukraine *can* say no, it’s not clear that Ukraine *should* say no, even to a deal that looks pretty bad on its face. Ukraine isn’t in danger of immediate collapse but a full cessation of US support is, like, not good, and the Europeans can’t make up the difference in the short or possibly even the medium term. This has less to do with material and finance than it does with Starlink and US intelligence cooperation, the end of which could have a potentially dramatic effect on the situation at the front.

To end on a point that is exceedingly likely to piss everyone off… I think it may be time for Zelenskyy to consider resigning. I know that we’re not supposed to treat politicians as heroes because it obscures the issues, and in any case they will inevitably disappoint, but Volodmyr Zelenskyy has turned in the most heroic performance as a national leader in my adult life. I’m not sure what’s left that he can do, and I suspect that the next steps might best be taken by someone else in the Ukrainian political system. A resignation would signal a strong interest in cooperation to both US and Russian leadership without actually making any specific concession… and Zelenskyy’s absence from the unpleasant negotiations to come may well preserve the possibility of a future role in a Ukraine that will need heroic leaders.