The Neutrality Option
By 
“Why can’t Ukraine just be Finland or Austria?” is becoming the last refuge of the scoundrel…
The USSR and the Western Allies imposed neutrality on Austria and Finland through force of arms. This imposition carried with it the legitimacy not simply of might makes right, but also of the extermination of the foulest regime to disgrace the modern historical record. Moreover, the Finns and the Austrians (to different degree) accepted the justice of this verdict.
Ukrainians will not accept this judgment. They do not believe that they have done anything wrong, and do not believe that their sovereignty should be abrogated out of concern for the convenience of their next door neighbor. They do not believe that Russia will refrain from military, political, and economic intervention in Ukraine in the future.
Analysts who style themselves “realist” seem to like the idea of Ukrainian neutrality; it recognizes Russia’s right to a sphere of influence and reduces the American commitment to the region, goals that the anti-engagement school has long treasured. But these “realists” might as well ask for a dozen Shield helicarriers and a battalion of unicorns. Forcing Ukraine to accept “neutrality” after suffering substantial territorial losses to Russia in 2014 was a no-go; Kyiv had lost any trust that it had in Moscow’s intentions.
The situation today is much worse; Ukrainians across the society actively hate Russia and Russians, and will not accept an agreement that reduces or eliminates Ukraine’s ability to protect itself.
My feeling is that talk about the Neutrality Option mainly exists in order to make “Restrainers” feel good about themselves. Life in Austria during the Cold War wasn’t so bad! Life in Finland wasn’t so bad! This trick enables the “Restrainer” to reduce the stakes of the conflict and explain to themself that the stakes of the war aren’t so high and that really it’s not worth it for Ukraine to continue fighting, and consequently that the United States and Europe should make clear to Ukraine that it needs to give up, etc. That a post-war Ukraine dominated by Russia isn’t likely to look like either Finland or Austria changes the stakes of the fight and makes it seem that the Ukrainians might actually be fighting for something important. The difference between Poland and Belarus is pretty big, and quite possibly worth fighting for, but a lot of “Restrainers” find that dichotomy uncomfortable, and would prefer to think that neutrality along Austrian lines is both possible and desirable. As such, it’s important to point out why this model is extremely unlikely to work in the Ukrainian context.