The Mexico Contingency

In light of the recent hurly burly on invading Mexico from the Trumpist wing of the GOP (hahahaha which is now basically the only wing of the GOP), 1945 asked me to repurpose and update a piece I wrote a while ago on Mexico’s national security policy:

The explanation for Mexico’s unusual national security policy seems straightforward. Mexico cannot hope to build a military capable of resisting the United States, much less protecting its emigrant populations or recovering lost territories. At the same time, no state other than the US can plausibly threaten Mexico’s security. Consequently, Mexico can afford to have a very small defense budget and a non-activist foreign policy. 

As an explanation for Mexican security policy, that’s fine as far as it goes, but it only goes so far. Canada has historically adopted a much more activist military and foreign policy. Ukraine and Poland most certainly have not adopted “Mexican” strategies with respect to Russia, instead preferring internal and external balancing. Vietnam has constructed its security policy around measured resistance to China, rather than accommodation. It is better to think of Mexico’s accommodationist security policy as a choice. It is almost certainly a good choice; antagonism would cost more and invite more extensive US intervention, internal balancing (military buildup) would cost a lot more, external balancing (alliance with foreign powers) is extremely difficult on the multilateral side and not all that productive even in bilateral terms. But Mexico is large enough and wealthy enough to consider alternative choices.

It’s pretty obvious to me that this is all fun and games for guys who want to a) cater to the most racist part of the GOP base, and b) get into the good graces of Donald Trump, but then b) is pretty much the same as a). The disturbing part is that it’s easy to imagine how terrible ideas like “invade Mexico” could find their way into policy in a second Trump White House.