Election(s) of the weekend
- Karnataka. The Indian State of approximately 65 million people concluded their local elections with what appears to be a defeat for Narendra Modi’s party, the BJP. Southern India has been a tough sell for Modi’s brand of politics, but they did break through and win power in Karnataka after the last election, the only Southern State they have been able to do so. Early results are in, and projections indicate a substantial loss for the BJP, with the Congress Party, their primary opposition, capturing over twice as many seats as the BJP for a comfortable parliamentary majority. While who governs a political entity of 65 million people is obviously important in its own right, this election has attracted considerable attention for those seeking clues about next year’s national election. This sense was heightened by Modi’s unusually high level of personal involvement in a local election. I have no idea how to think about Modi’s potential vulnerability, and it would be a mistake to overcorrect your priors in light of this result (for one thing, the state-level Congress Party appears to be much less of a basket case than the national party, and incumbent parties generally perform poorly in Karnataka), but still: good news is better than bad news.
- Thailand. Sunday will see the second Thai election since the 2014 coup. Since the previous election, the Thai electoral system has been altered in ways that tend to favor larger parties. To call the first post-Coup election in 2019 a “return to democracy” would appear to be premature, as the Junta’s dubious conduct included changing district lines last minute and appointing the entirety of the Senate. It resulted in a pro-Junta party, Palang Prachareth, leading a coalition government. Signs point to significant changes, should tomorrow’s election results be respected. Support for nationalist/royalist/military parties appears to have collapsed, with Palang Prachereth polling in low single digits and a new pro-military conservative party joined by key military figures, hovering around 10% in the polls. The two leading parties in the polls are Pheu Thai, a successor party to wealthy businessman and former PM (2001-2006, when he was removed from power by a military coup) Thaksin Shinawatra’s People’s Power Party. This party is alternatively classified as populist, center/center-right, and pro-economic liberalism. One can’t help but get the sense that support for this party isn’t particularly ideological, and they represent an ideologically non-specific way to protest the current ruling establishment. The party’s current leader, Thaksin’s daughter, has made modest expansions of the welfare state central to her campaign. Polling almost as well (they’re both in the 30’s) is the new Move Forward Party: a youth-oriented social democratic party, who have focused on scrapping the military-authored constitution, ending universal male conscription, and reforming Thailand’s infamously strict lese majeste laws, an issue aided by the beloved old King shuffling off this mortal coil and being replaced by his far less popular son. This election’s two big questions: First, will the voters deliver the substantial mandate for change the polls suggest they will, and second, will the Royalist/military power tolerate a peaceful transfer of power, if they do?
- Turkey. This is the big one, obviously, that the world will be watching. Erdogan appears, for the first time since the 2002 election, genuinely vulnerable. Polls show his challenger, retired civil servant Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leads the Republican People’s Party, Turkey’s oldest political party founded by Attaturk himself. This party and the coalition supporting him. The Labor and Freedom Alliance, a coalition of left-leaning policies, declining to run a presidential candidate and supporting Kılıçdaroğlu, is a sign of this. Erdogan’s vulnerability is closely tied to declines in Turkish economic fortunes, tied to recent currency crises, inflation (the hard stuff, not this single digit stuff soft Americans whine about), and a significant cost of living crisis. He does not appear to be significantly benefitting from any kind of rally around the flag effect from the earthquake. A recent poll of polls suggested Erdogan is down by 5 in tomorrow’s election, but should this go to a runoff (there are two minor candidates, winner must get 50%+1), that deficit declines to 2. Erdogan’s illiberalism is on full display as usual, including a request for twitter to censor certain tweets in Turkey (free speech warrior Elon Musk, of course, complied with the request, and responded in characteristically petulant fashion to the idea that choice might be worth a twitter files investigatory effort). I can’t imagine any reader of this blog needs me to tell them how big of a deal Erdogan losing would be. If you haven’t been walking around being both anxious and hopeful about it, you’ve got 24 hours and change remaining to do so.