If Ukraine had kept Soviet nuclear missiles
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Bill Clinton has joined the chorus of “If Ukraine had kept its nuclear weapons, Russia would never have invaded.” Bill never was very good at foreign policy. He was right then, and he’s wrong now.
What people mean when they make that claim is “If Ukraine in January 2022 (or January 2014) had nuclear weapons that could be used against Russia, then Russia would never have invaded.” This claim is based on two big assumptions: that a Ukraine that retained the nuclear weapons on its territory in 1994 would have followed the same path as the Ukraine that signed the Budapest Memorandum, and that Ukraine could have repurposed those weapons into a defensive stand against Russia. I’ve written about this in the past.
For a history of what actually happened, check out Mariana Budjeryn’s “Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine.” It’s the most complete history of these events. Let’s consider how Ukraine might have developed if it had kept those nuclear weapons.
1992
Economic transition was difficult for the 15 new countries that had formerly been Soviet republics. The Soviet system had isolated the USSR from the rest of the world, but that system had given them some stability and markets. Now they were exposed to the world without even that. The governments they inherited from being Soviet republics provided some structure, but across the fifteen, their capabilities varied. The Baltic states had been preparing for a break, and Turkmenistan was clueless. Ukraine was somewhere in the middle.
Ukraine was one of three countries outside Russia in which Soviet nuclear missiles were based. It is those missiles that Bill Clinton and others urged Ukraine to give up. They were aimed at the United States and its allies and controlled from Moscow.
1993
Kazakhstan and Belarus agreed to send the missiles and nuclear weapons on their territories back to Russia, which had inherited the USSR’s nuclear weapons status in the United Nations and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Ukraine continued to negotiate while they tried to figure out how to repurpose the missiles.
1994
The negotiations break down, and the parties (US, UK, Russia) sign memoranda in Budapest with Belarus and Kazakhstan only. The three counterparties feel very strongly that the breakup of the Soviet Union should not lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons. The US and other countries developed programs to aid the countries of the former USSR in securing nuclear materials and to employ weapons scientists so that they would not be tempted to take their expertise to potential proliferators. Offers are made to Ukraine for limited collaboration, but Ukraine turns them down, fearing that they will interfere with repurposing the nuclear missiles.
NATO also made a variety of programs available to the former Soviet republics, including Russia. By retaining nuclear weapons, Ukraine put itself in Russia’s company, in which NATO’s involvement is much more tentative.
All that deprives Ukraine of financial support for repurposing Soviet laboratories in nuclear and biological research. Already in financial difficulty because of the economic shift, Ukraine must decide whether to finance programs for the maintenance and retargeting of the nuclear missiles or rebuilding the civilian economy.
1995
From before the USSR broke up, Ukraine had a problem with corruption, and that corruption was part of Russia’s control of Ukraine. Ukrainians who became wealthy under desovietization, like Russian oligarchs, were also corrupt.
Corruption was the reason for the 2013 Maidan demonstrations and continues through President Volodymyr Zelensky’s firing of a number of officials. Corruption was the reason that Donald Trump thought he could shake down Zelinsky for dirt on Joe Biden.
Ukraine needs a way to deal with those nuclear weapons. They have figured out how to get around the permissive action links and to retarget the missiles. These are high-yield nuclear weapons, and disassembling and redesigning the warheads is a question. New designs are unpredictable.
Nuclear weapons must be maintained. Tritium must be replaced. With a twelve-year half-life, significant amounts of it will have decayed. Inspections are needed to make sure the electronics and conventional explosives will work. Likewise, the missiles must be maintained. All this is expensive.
There is, an oligarch conveys to the president, a nearby great power with intimate knowledge of those weapons that might help. Help from Russia, however, would be controversial. There is a Ukrainian political party completely opposed to interactions with Russia that supports maintaining those nuclear weapons. Internal Ukrainian politics become conflicted.
2000
Russia is explicitly helping the Ukrainian nuclear weapons program and other aspects of its military. Russia-related Ukrainian oligarchs control the Ukrainian government. These developments could affect internal Russian politics, but let’s say that Vladimir Putin becomes president.
2005
Demonstrations within Ukraine against corruption are smaller and weaker, easily put down. NATO and the EU have had cool relations with Ukraine since the decision to keep the Soviet weapons. Russia and Ukraine negotiate a friendship treaty that gives Russia full use of the Crimean port of Sebastopol for 100 years. The Russian nuclear chief directorate, GUMO 12, is in charge of the nuclear missile depots.
The Maidan demonstrations never take place. Russia has no need to annex Crimea. The conquest of Ukraine is peaceful and complete.
Cross-posted to Nuclear Diner