“These are Our Rocks”

At the Diplomat this week, some strategic lessons from the Falklands:

Lyle Goldstein, Christopher Yung, andThe Diplomat’s James Holmes have all gone over the many lessons the PLA Navy (PLAN) may have drawn from the Falklands War. Unlike many countries, China is in a position to draw lessons from both the British and the Argentine experiences during the war.  The effectiveness of British naval aviation surely impressed upon the Chinese the need for intrinsic air support for maritime operations, while at the same time providing grist for the need to improve the anti-access system of systems. Submarines had long played an important role in PLAN doctrine, but the destruction of General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror put an exclamation point on the vulnerability of surface ships to undersea attack.  Perhaps more importantly, the sinking deterred the Argentine Navy from any further serious sorties during the conflict. The Argentines were unable to reply in kind due to their small and obsolescent undersea force.

A few thoughts regarding how we should think about the Falklands War today…

1. The people who lived on the Falkland Islands were committed to remaining British in 1982, just as they’re committed to being British today.
2. Argentina’s claim is based on an argument of questionable validity dating from 1833.
3. While Argentina’s case for “just war” is based on the kind of squishy logic that you often find in specious just war arguments, the United Kingdom’s case is iron clad.
4. I suspect that any British Prime Minister would have fought to keep the Falklands in 1982; Thatcher is not particularly special in this regard.
5. While negotiations continued over the course of the conflict, Argentine success (interpreted as sovereignty over the islands) depended on two questions; will Britain fight, and can Britain be beaten. Argentina had no reason to withdraw prior to the point at which the first was decided, and Britain had little incentive to negotiate after committing the task force. Both sides were constrained by public opinion.
6. The war was conducted, on both sides, in fairly strict accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict. With regard to the General Belgrano, there is no serious case that the sinking represented a war crime.

Put differently, the Falklands War is pretty much all on Galtieri, not Thatcher.  I find it odd that for a time during the 1980s (and this has certainly faded) displaying anti-colonialist cred meant supporting the (mostly specious) claims of a vile right wing dictatorship over a Western democracy (notwithstanding who headed that democracy).  The best case against Thatcher is simply that the Falklands were not worth the risk.  There’s a certain merit to that, even if you’re skeptical (as I am) that Argentina could ever have been convinced to hand back the Malvinas without a fight; some war just aren’t worth fighting, just or no.  But then I suspect that if the Malvinas had remained in Argentine hands, even if victory hadn’t extended the lifespan of the military junta more than a year or two, that the situation of the British population on the islands would remain a significant human rights concern today, and would continue to poison Argentine relations with Europe.