Inter-Service Rivalry

This week’s Over the Horizon column is about inter-service rivalry:

Because different services perform different missions, not all contribute equally to certain grand strategic tasks: The Royal Navy’s contribution to the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan is severely limited, while the British army does not normally contribute to anti-piracy patrols such as those off of Somalia. Inter-service conflict focusing on resources, therefore, is about the prioritization of particular strategic goals. Each service, like any other bureaucratic organization, tends to believe that its own parochial missions fall more in line with national security goals than those of the other branches. The classic example of a resource conflict involves that of a warship versus army brigade: The units have different capabilities, perform different jobs, and suggest a different focus for national strategic priorities. Nations may find themselves forced to choose between options, but can reconcile limitations by adjusting strategic commitments.

A different kind of inter-service conflict involves mission allocation. In the last century, the need for collaboration between air, ground, and sea assets has increased dramatically. The primary driver of such integration has been the expansion of warfare into the third dimension. Aircraft now represent an organic part of most military missions, from ground assault (close air support) and interdiction (exploitation) to anti-submarine warfare and counter-sea operations. Aircraft are as necessary to the efficient and successful execution of tactical- and operational-level military tasks as infantry, armor, and artillery. However, bureaucratic walls have been erected in both the United States and the United Kingdom placing different elements of these missions in different services.

This was distilled from a longer article comparing British and American experiences of inter-service rivalry that never really went anywhere.  One nice thing about having a column (or a blog) is that you can repurpose certain arguments such that you don’t feel like a failed article is a complete waste.  In any case, this inter-service angle is going to be a significant part of the hopefully-someday-will-get-published Abolish the Air Force book; independent air forces by their nature break apart organic mission sets, creating unnecessary bureaucratic barriers as well a bad institutional incentives for missions with shared responsibilities.