Politics by Military Means?

Army Colonel Matthew Moten has a piece in this month’s Foreign Affairs criticizing the declining professionalism of the US military:

Professions gain and maintain the trust of society with proven expertise derived from a long, formal education, years of practice and a demonstrated commitment to employing that expertise wisely and ethically. If the military loses the confidence of society, it will be exceedingly difficult to establish the interpersonal trust essential for effective political-military relations.

I found Moten’s piece thoughtful and informative, however it left me with two questions. The first is whether his analysis fits his apparent position on McChrystal’s departure from Afghanistan. On the one hand, he appears to support Obama’s decision to sack the general for his senior staff’s criticism of civilian officials, and he follows many commentators in arguing that this was a necessary step to preserve civilian authority over the military:

McChrystal and his staff expressed an intolerable level of disrepsect for and mistrust of their superiors, which is completely at odds with the military’s professional ethic, the constitutional principle of civilian control, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice… in removing McChrystal for making disparaging comments…. the president reasserted the constitutional principle of civilian control of the military.

Yet Moten’s actual thesis is that that relationship is actually as strong as ever and needed no reassertion, and that the real issue is not the civilian-military relationship but rather professional norms within the military as an institution:

Respected observers of political-military relations are concerned that comtempt of civilian leadership is widespread withinthe military and that the problem is getting worse with the passing years of seemingly interminable wars… but I have yet to see evidence of such a cancer… In fact, the current state of relations between the US’ highest civilian and military leaders is quite good… the McChrystal affairs was a sign of an emerging crisis not in political-military relations but in military professionalism.

If so, how could the political-military relationship have been so threatened by the open discontent of a few frustrated military officials that Obama had no choice but to remove a commander who by all measures was doing a stellar job in Afghanistan, simply to “reassert civilian control”?

Second, I’m intrigued by Moten’s suggestion that military professionalism is being undermined by the increasing politicization of retired military generals, who he argues are “abrogating the ethos of nonpartisanship” by taking open political positions as former military:

If retired officers want to engage in political advocacy – including criticizing current policy or serving officials and endorsing political candidates – they should explicitly distance themselves from the armed services, stating that they are speaking for themselves alone.

I see some merit in this argument, but I also see a contradiction here. While Moten would like active-duty and even retired military to take no public “political” positions such as endorsing candidates, he seems to favor a public stance by the military on “professional” issues – such as a firm line against the outsourcing of weapons-bearing to civilian contractors. Moten suggests that military leaders should be actively lobbying Congress to change these and other corrupting practices.

The paradox of this argument, of course, is that many of the practices he cites as undermining the professionalism of the military are genuinely political issues. The privatization of war has, as he acknowledges, been a policy choice. The hiring of retired flag officers as advisors with inadequate oversight into their connections to defense contractors is an policy choice.

Or consider one of the most fundamental indicators of a well-disciplined military: adherence to basic international norms of conduct in battle zones. Military leaders have often been the first to argue in favor of a close adherence to the Geneva Conventions, particularly because the rules also protect US troops. I would join Moten in suggesting that there is a constructive role for the military to play here. But how can take such a position without dipping one’s toe inadvertently in politics, in an era where the very question of what it means to follow the Geneva Conventions has been politicized both on the campaign trail and off?

So I wonder if Moten’s argument is coherent or consistent. But I do think he is raising very useful questions, pragmatically and analytically, that deserve careful consideration by those interested in the role and purpose of our military, both in our wars abroad and in our domestic socio-political structures.

P.S. Maybe McChrystal will use these questions as discussion fodder in his new Yale seminar on leadership. Maybe not.