Rethinking Chem-Bio Capabilities

Al Mauroni argues that we’re bringing third-generation thinking to a fourth generation fight:

Military analysts and politicians continue to view NBC weapons and CBRN hazards in terms of third-generation warfare. Any use of chemical, biological or radiological weapons, no matter how small, is considered a mass-destruction situation.

Terrorist groups and insurgents rely on locally available materials and nonstate-affiliated personnel to acquire conventional weapons. At best, terrorist attempts to employ CBRN hazards as weapons will result in small-scale, single attacks with limited casualties.

There is no better example than Iraqi insurgents’ failed use of chlorine tanks within vehicle-embedded improvised explosive devices. Those insurgents stopped employing this tactic because it didn’t work, yet military analysts point to this singularity and call it the beginning of terrorist WMD ambitions.

It is not easy to obtain military-grade CBRN material, to make military-grade CBRN material or to effectively disperse such agents. Without access to tons of CBR material and a good dispersion system, the capability to cause mass casualties decreases dramatically. If terrorists attempt to develop a WMD-like capability, they will attract much more attention and are liable to be interdicted at multiple points in the process of executing their plot.

Certainly, it is possible to obtain toxic inhalation hazards, develop small amounts of biological toxins, or gain quantities of radiological material and develop improvised methods to disperse them. Nonstate actors can employ improvised CBRN weapons, but these are not WMD capabilities. Nation-state WMD programs are still a significant threat, but we need to stop acting as if nonstate actors can duplicate that threat.

Relying on counter-WMD strategies and military defense equipment that anticipate terrorist use of NBC weapons will not protect the public or armed forces. We need to desegregate counterproliferation, counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities and strategies. We need to focus on developing discrete capabilities that address the distinct threats of military NBC weapons and terrorist CBRN hazards.

Looking forward to the QDR….