It’s 3 AM; Do You Know Where Your Nuclear Submarine Is?

Remarkably interesting post this morning from Hans Kristensen on nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) patrols; last year the United States Navy conducted 31 deterrent patrols, as compared to a combined total of 22 by Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. Although China possesses three SSBNs, the PLAN has yet to perform any deterrent patrols. A deterrent patrol amounts, essentially, to an extended effort on the part of the submarine to hide underwater, while aiming its missiles at a potential opponent; USN patrols last three months of so. The thirty-one patrols (by 14 SSBNs) is the lowest number of patrols since 1962, in part due to a different operational tempo (fewer, longer patrols), but mostly because the number of SSBNs in the fleet has declined substantially since the early 1990s.

I’m of two minds on the SSBN patrols. As Hans notes:

In short, the nuclear powers seem to be recommitting themselves to an era of deploying large numbers of nuclear weapons in the oceans. Most people tend to view sea-based nuclear weapons as the most legitimate leg of the Triad. Yet of all strategic nuclear weapons, sea-based ballistic missiles are the most difficult to track, the most problematic to communicate with in a crisis, the hardest to verify in an arms control agreement, and the only ones that can sneak up on an adversary in a surprise attack.

I’m not sure that SSBNs are that hard to verify in an arms control agreement; they’re easy to hide at sea, but not in port, and we apparently have enough data about submarine patrols that Hans can write a long post describing each nation’s patrol strategy. That said, the other arguments are largely true, especially the points on crisis communication and surprise attack. The latter is less of an issue for the United States (I very much doubt that any Russian or Chinese submarine could “sneak up on” the US), but remains a concern for those navies unable to detect modern SSBNs. And as the French and British have recently demonstrated, SSBNs can have accidents just like any other nuclear platform.

Absent multilateral nuclear disarmament, however, I think that SSBNs are probably the safest place for the world’s nuclear powers to keep their weapons. The other legs of the nuclear triad (bomber aircraft and land based missiles) have their own issues, and SSBNs go a long way towards ensuring secure second strike. If both Pakistan and India possessed SSBNs, the nuclear balance between them would be more stable, rather than less. Hans is correct, I think, to suggest that the United States could do with rather less than fourteen SSBNs, as the British and the French manage with only four. The Russians have twelve, with seven in reserve and three under construction; some energetic arms control activity might serve to further reduce both the US and Russian SSBN fleets.