Leverage, Real And Imagined

With respect to the question of whether the stimulus can get 60 votes, Drum outlines what the Democratic leadership should be thinking:

If Republicans really did put up a united front and filibuster the legislation, the Democratic leadership would just turn around and consider the bill under budget reconciliation rules, which require only a majority vote to pass. Sure, they’ve already said they’d prefer not to do that, but if they have to they will. And since the bill is all about short-term spending, it would obviously qualify under reconciliation rules.

So all the public handwringing seems like standard DC negotiating kabuki to me, not a genuine effort to kill the bill. If Republicans filibuster, the public will view them as bitter obstructionists and the bill will pass anyway. It’s hard to see what’s in it for them to go down this road.

In theory, this is of course correct; a filibuster should be both politically damaging and futile for the Republicans, and the Democrats shouldn’t just assume that they need 60 votes but should compel an actual filibuster before just passing the best stimulus they can under reconciliation rules if necessary. The Democrats should realize that the GOP has very little actual leverage here. Whether they do, of course, is another question, and I’m much less optimistic about the answer than Kevin. (Admittedly, it’s hard to tell the difference between concessions being offered to appease Republicans and concessions being offered to appease Blue Dogs.)