Fundamental Rights and State Interests

Since there seems to be some confusion here, allow me to save time in comments by explaining a basic distinction:

1)Under current law, a woman has a fundamental right to choose an abortion. And if Griswold is right, this conclusion is inescapable. (It’s possible to argue that this implicit right doesn’t exist, of course, but that’s a different argument.)

2)To say that a woman has a fundamental right to choose an abortion does not mean that this right is unlimited. The Supreme Court’s current standard has watered the right down in O’Connor’s classic incoherent manner, but even if you believe in a robust right it can be abridged if legislation is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. No rights are absolute, and this certainly includes the right to privacy. Bans on post-viability abortions with a health exception qualify. Bans on pre-viability abortions as they are typically written and enforced do not. If you think that obtaining an abortion should carry less legal sanctions than spitting on the sidewalk, you’re essentially conceding that the state does not have a compelling enough interest to override a fundamental right.

At any rate, to say that a right can be overriden in certain limited circumstances is quite different than the more typical conservative claim that a woman’s right to choose an abortion doesn’t exist at all.