On the Folly of the Liberal Interventionists

Let’s be clear; not only is Anne Marie Slaughter making less sense than Ross Douthat, she’s also making less sense than Paul Wolfowitz:

It is only in the context of a larger assistance strategy that a no-fly zone should be considered. It would be different from the prolonged and largely futile zones imposed over southern Iraq from 1991-2003 or over Bosnia from 1992-1995. Intended to stop the genocides of the Marsh Arabs in Iraq and of the Muslim population of Bosnia, they did neither. Critics accurately point out that the massacre of 11,000 Muslims in Srebrenica took place under a NATO-imposed no-fly zone. But the situation in Libya would be very different if the Libyan people are properly armed.

Say what you will about the tenets of neoconservatism, dude, but at least it’s an ethos. Wolfowitz has answers to most of the questions I pose here, while Slaughter is left shilling for an almost-certain-to-be-useless no fly zone that will serve mainly as a pretext for further intervention. Whether they leave the point implicit or explicit, the neocons are reasonably clear about their preferences; we should support the rebels to the extent that we can be certain that they’ll win, and then we should install and support whichever parts of the rebel alliance are most to our liking. Slaughter’s approach amounts to “no fly and pray.”